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Sober Regrets and Shared Risk Taking: Navigating Intoxicated Consent and Rape in the Courtroom 
Amanda Clough 
Introduction 
How do we protect the sexual autonomy of an intoxicated person? Alternatively, perhaps a more 
pressing question is whether we need to protect intoxicated people from their own decisions. When 
it comes to intoxication and rape, the law seems to mostly be concerned with protecting victims 
from decisions others have made for them, essentially removing their freedom and capacity to 
choose who, when, where and how to have sexual relations. Somehow, the criminal law has to 
Ŷaǀigate a ǁaǇ to ƌespeĐt aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s ƌight to seek out suĐh ƌelatioŶs, ǁhilst also upholdiŶg theiƌ 
right to refuse.1 It is with this giving or withholding of consent that we exercise our autonomy and 
navigate our lives.2 As Wallerstein has pointed out: 
͞(positive) sexual autonomy is valuable only insofar as it allows a capable individual to make 
valuable decisions as to her sexual activity.͟3 
Whilst the introduction of a definition of consent within the Sexual Offences Act 2003 was 
welcomed, whether it has adequately encompassed the voluntarily intoxicated victim and accused is 
an area which has given the courts food for thought. The voluntarily intoxicated victim must rely 
only upon the standard consent definition contained in section 74 Sexual Offences Act 2003 unless 
they were unconscious when the sexual act was performed. It has been suggested that the decision 
in Dougal4 led to government concern if there is sufficient protection within the 2003 Act for victims 
who are vulnerable and genuinely lack capacity.5 However, what the courts have been unable to 
establish from the wording of the statutory definition is exactly where the line is to be drawn so that 
an individual who is not yet unconscious may have lost the capacity to give a meaningful and legal 
valid consent to sexual intercourse. 
Involuntary but not voluntary 
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 established a rebuttable presumption for the victim involuntarily 
intoxicated that consent will not be present;6 however, no such presumption has been laid out for 
victims who are responsible for their own intoxicated state. Although the government report 
͚“ettiŶg the BouŶdaƌies͛ suggested that intoxicated victims should be included alongside those who 
are asleep or unconscious,7 without mention of how they came to be intoxicated, this was not 
included in the 2003 Act for fear of ,ŵaliĐious aĐĐusatioŶs͛.8 This has caused academics to recognise 
the Report as being much more progressive than the legislation we were finally left with in 
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5 Supra n(1) 240 
6 S75(2)(f) 
7 Home Office, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the Law on Sexual Offences, July 2000, Para 2.10.9 
8 Convicting Rapists and Protecting Victims – Justice for Victims of Rape: A Consultation Paper (Office for 
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Baƌƌisteƌs’ PeƌspeĐtiǀes oŶ the “eǆual OffeŶĐes AĐt Ϯ00ϯ aŶd its IŵpaĐt oŶ PƌaĐtiĐe’, (2010) 74(6) Jounrla of 
Criminal Law 579-600, 584, 
recognising the perils of twenty-first century courtship.9 However, even if it had been included in 
section 75, there would still be the same difficulty in deciding the amount of intoxication sufficient 
and insufficient to invalidate consent.10 
Although this area of the law remains fraught with tension, it is not necessarily a common element. 
That is to say, cases where it is questioned if the victim had the capacity to consent are vastly 
outweighed by cases where it was questioned if the intoxicated victim did in fact consent at all, 
though it is speculated by some that such incapacity cases are under-represented because it is 
difficult to build a case in a situation where memory lapses are often prominent.11 Though the cases 
of this nature which see a prosecution may be few, there is still a need to fully understand both 
when a person loses their capacity to consent through intoxication, and how to proceed when two 
people, uŶdeƌ aŶ ͚intoxicated fog͛ at the time of the incident,12 give very different accounts of 
whether or not consent was present. Essentially, we need to assess if there was no capacity to 
consent, or no consent despite capacity, and we do not have a clear road ahead.13 As the Home 
Office stated in their Report: 
͞The law should be as clear as possible so that the boundaries of what is acceptable, and criminally 
culpable behaviour are well understood – espeĐiallǇ iŶ the diffiĐult aƌea of seǆual ƌelatioŶs͟14 
It was also noted that this does not negate the role of the common law to develop and assess new 
issues as they arise,15 but is that the correct arena for intoxicated rape, given the majority of cases 
involve alcohol consumption? The silence of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 on rape accusations 
involving excessive drinking on the part of the victim (or perhaps the defendant too) is deafening. 
Leaving voluntarily intoxicated victims to be dealt with this way, while the involuntarily intoxicated 
victim is automatically presumed to have not consented to sexual relations, implies a hierarchy, with 
special protection for those who do not choose to intoxicate of their own accord.16 How does this 
mesh with the objective of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to assist and encourage victims to come 
forward?17 The low conviction rates suggest that the law remains inadequate with plenty of room for 
improvement.18 
Alcohol-fuelled Sexual Relations 
The fact remains that many rape accusations involve a scenario where the victim was intoxicated, 
with one American study finding 60% of victims had consumed alcohol prior to the incident, with a 
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320, 303 and 305 
10 K Cole, ͚Sex and the Single-Malt Giƌl: Hoǁ VoluŶtaƌǇ IŶtoǆiĐatioŶ AffeĐts CoŶseŶt’, (2017) 78 Montana Law 
Review 155, 161 
11 Gunby et al, Supra n(6) 590 
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Western Law Review 407, 407 
13 R v Gael Tameu Kamk [2013] EWCA Crim 2335 [15] 
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15 Ibid, 2.7.4 
16 B “iŵpsoŶ, ͚WhǇ Has the CoŶĐept of CoŶseŶt PƌoǀeŶ so DiffiĐult to ClaƌifǇ?’, (2016) 80(2) Journal of Criminal 
Law 97-123, 115 
17 J TeŵkiŶ aŶd A Ashǁoƌth, ͚The Sexual Offences Act 2003: (1) Rape, Sexual Assaults, and the Problem of 
CoŶseŶt’, (2004) Criminal Law Review 328-346, 329 
18 J ElǀiŶ, ͚IŶtoǆiĐatioŶ, CapaĐitǇ to CoŶseŶt, aŶd the “eǆual OffeŶĐes AĐt Ϯ00ϯ’, ;ϮϬϬϴͿ ϭϵ KiŶg͛s Laǁ JouƌŶal 
151, 154 
much higher percentage of 81% within the student population.19 Alcohol plays a major part of adult 
social interactions in Western Society. One media outlet referred to such cases as going to ͚the heart 
of contemporary mores, and the place where alcohol, sexual adventuƌisŵ aŶd the laǁ Đollide͛.20 
Those who do choose to indulge and do so on a regular basis will likely be aware of the impact 
alcohol may have on their behaviour and decision-making process. Perhaps this is the goal for some; 
to lower their inhibitions and let their proverbial hair down. The difficulty comes when two people, 
who may have even consumed alcohol together have different recollections of ͚ǁhat happeŶed 
Ŷeǆt͛. Although ͚aĐƋuaiŶtaŶĐe ƌape͛ alǁaǇs ŵeaŶs ideŶtifǇiŶg the suspeĐt is a ŵuĐh easieƌ task, in 
reality it may be much more difficult to prosecute and convict.21 The AŵeƌiĐaŶ Model PeŶal Code͛s 
CoŵŵeŶtaƌǇ Ŷotes that ͚liƋuoƌ aŶd dƌugs...aƌe ĐoŵŵoŶ iŶgƌedieŶts iŶ the ƌitual of Đouƌtship͛.22 
Kramer has even identified commercial companies openly depictiŶg alĐohol ͚as aŶ aphƌodisiaĐ͛.23 
When we talk about the capacity of an intoxicated person to choose whether or not to engage in 
sexual relations, some speculate that this may not only include not understanding the activities they 
are engaging in, but an ͚iŶautheŶtiĐ͛ ĐoŶseŶt ǁhiĐh is out of ĐhaƌaĐteƌ foƌ the ǀiĐtiŵ aŶd ǁill 
undoubtedly be heavily regretted when sober.24 Is it just the capacity to understand that this is 
seǆual iŶteƌĐouƌse, oƌ is soŵe ͚aĐtual suďjeĐtiǀe deliďeƌatiǀe pƌoĐess͛ ƌeƋuiƌed too?25 Bree appears 
to have set the threshold very high when it comes to this argument.26  
Capacity is often linked to concepts of knowledge and understanding, but this definition is more akin 
to issues of age and mental illness or disability27 – much as the explanatory notes for the Sexual 
OffeŶĐes AĐt ϮϬϬϯ eǆplaiŶ the ǁoƌd ͚ĐapaĐitǇ͛ ǁithiŶ seĐtioŶ ϳϰ to Đoǀeƌ.28 In cases of intoxication, 
does capacity have a different meaning? As Firth notes, the Bench Book offers little guidance, simply 
stating that the jury decides on the issue of capacity.29 This is true – it will depend on the facts, but 
what can we look for in the facts to signify incapacity? 
We do not legally allow someone to get a tattoo whilst intoxicated, but this is likely akin with public 
opinion, as Goodman has noted.30 This same opinion is unlikely to extend to making intoxicated 
consent to sex invalid, as long as we are capable of making up our minds.31 What we need to ask of 
the voluntarily intoxicated victim, or in fact, any intoxicated victim, is could she make a choice, and if 
yes, what did she choose? As the trial judge stated in Kamki:  
͞IŶ a state of diŵ aŶd dƌuŶkeŶ aǁaƌeŶess, a peƌsoŶ ŵaǇ Ŷot ďe iŶ a ĐoŶditioŶ to ŵake ĐhoiĐes͟.32 
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20 ‘ AĐklaŶd, ͚This DoesŶ͛t Get to ďe Oǀeƌ foƌ Me; The ‘ape Case That Put CoŶseŶt oŶ Tƌial͛, The Guardian, 20th 
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21 Ryan, Supra n(12) 410 
22 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries, 315 (1980) 
23 K M Kƌaŵeƌ, ͚Rule by Myth: The Social and Legal Dynamics Governing Alcohol-Related Acquaintance Rape’, 
(1004) 47 Stanford Law Review 115, 123 
24 Cole Supra n(10) 156 
25 ibid 
26 Bree 
27 Gunby et al, Supra n(8) 582 
28 Explanatory Notes [139] 
29 G Fiƌth, ͚Not an Invitation to Rape: The Sexual Offences Act 2003, Consent and the Case of the Drunken 
ViĐtiŵ’, (2011) 62 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 99, 107 
30 C Chambers Goodman, Brigham Young University Law Review, 57, 73 
31 This particular phrase was used by Scarman LJ in Lang (1976) 62 Cr App R 50, 52 
32 R v Gael Tameu Kamki [2013] EWCA Crim 2335 [17] 
What would certainly be beneficial here is an indication as to what signifies when a person is in such 
a condition as to render them unable to make choices. As Elliott aŶd De ThaŶ Ŷote, ͚a legislative 
ƌespoŶse to the ŵeaŶiŶg of ĐapaĐitǇ ǁould ďe appƌopƌiate͛ foƌ puƌposes of pƌoǀidiŶg ĐlaƌitǇ, ƌatheƌ 
than situations it might cover.33 In medical law, capacity requires an ability to comprehend or retain 
information material to making that decision.34 Though the Bree decision is championed as the holy 
grail of voluntary intoxication and rape,35 there remains no sure way of detecting if a victim is 
beyond the realm of making choices. Indeed, even if large quantities of alcohol have been 
consumed, the victim may remain absolutely capable of giving valid legal consent.36 If we cannot 
haǀe a ͚gƌid sǇsteŵ͛ as ǁas Ŷoted iŶ Bree, are there other physical precursors that may be used as a 
checklist? This will be discussed. 
Bad Decisions 
Many of the cases on alcohol-related rapes find a sympathetic ear in light of the victim and the 
situation they found themselves in. Being separated from friends,37 trying to get home, and making 
deĐisioŶs eǀeŶ the ǀiĐtiŵ ǁould deeŵ ͚ďad͛ iŶ ƌetƌospeĐt. Bad decisions and regrets must be 
distinguished from the situation at the moment of penetration, as difficult as this can sometimes be. 
Regret seems to play a prominent role in discussion of false reporting. Though the victim may be 
responsible for getting drunk, they may not be responsible for their consent – if they consented at 
all.38 However, if the victim did have capacity and did consent, that is a consequence of their 
voluntary intoxication they must deal with, even if regrettable.  
It is noted that by Ryan that women take risks when intoxicated that they would normally avoid,39 
but this risk-taking may be just be one reckless aspect of the reckless act of intoxication itself. That is 
not to say that the victim is necessarily responsible for the circumstances that may come about. As 
Kramer speculates, the consumption of alcohol can interfere with the ability of a victim to remove 
themselves from a situation which is unwelcomed, or even dangerous.40 If a person chooses to drink, 
or even get drunk, this does not mean they also choose to have sex,41 and the trauma of rape should 
Ŷeǀeƌ ďe ŵaƌgiŶalised oǀeƌ a ǀiĐtiŵ͛s ĐhoiĐes.42 
Double Standards 
A prevalent problem, particularly in cases of the mutual voluntary intoxication of acquaintances, is 
that ǁhile the aĐĐused ǁill ďe giǀeŶ the ďeŶefit of ͚ƌeasoŶaďle douďt͛ iŶ assessiŶg a situatioŶ ǁhile 
intoxicated, the victim will be held partially responsible for their own demise. Much as provoking 
conduct has traditionally relegated a murder charge to manslaughter, the alleged rape victim who is 
dƌuŶk, aloŶe, aŶd ǁeaƌiŶg little is also deeŵed aĐĐouŶtaďle foƌ this ͚pƌoǀoĐatiǀe ĐoŶduĐt͛. 
Victim-Blaming and Accused Exculpation 
                                                          
33 Elliot and De Than, Supra n(1)241 
34 Re MB (1997) 2 FLR 426, Sloss LJ 
35 C DǇeƌ, ͚Judge “aǇs Neǁ Laǁ oŶ ‘ape aŶd AlĐohol is UŶŶeĐessaƌǇ͛, The Guardian 27th March 2007 
36 A ‘eed, ͚Rape aŶd DƌuŶkeŶ CoŶseŶt’, (2007) 176 Criminal Lawyer 3-4, 3 
37 R v H [2007] EWCA Crim 2056 
38 Wallerstein, Supra n(3) 328 
39 Ryan, Supra n(12) 412 
40 Kramer, Supra n(23) 146 
41 Firth, Supra n(29) 111 
42 Gunby et al, Supra n(8) 97 
In other areas of criminal law, cognition of the accused takes centre stage,43 as opposed to 
behaviour control. If a defendant is intoxicated, we ask if they could form the necessary mens rea for 
the crime, rather than asking if they would have acted in the same manner had they been sober. 
For the victims, their level of intoxication is also a very important fact. It could bring into play both 
memory loss and incapacity. The relevance here ends – why they chose to drink, what they chose to 
drink and where they chose to go are not necessarily relevant. However, this seems to be at the 
foƌefƌoŶt of Ŷot oŶlǇ the juƌǇ͛s ŵiŶd, ďut the judiĐiaƌǇ too.44 Though there may be evidentiary issues 
with alcohol-related memory-loss rape victims, this sends a very different message as to who is to 
blame for the assault. Rather than seeing the situation as the risk of rape being increased when a 
victim is intoxicated, the prevailing thought seems to be that if the victim created the situation, then 
they are responsible for it. A study in 2005 found that 30% of participants thought a woman was 
partially or wholly responsible if raped when intoxicated,45 pƌesuŵaďlǇ ďeĐause ͚she is the authoƌ of 
heƌ oǁŶ ŵisfoƌtuŶe͛.46  
As Wallerstein infers, although getting drunk and therefore making yourself vulnerable may be an 
aĐt of ͚stupiditǇ͛,47 this does not diminish the responsibility of the accused, and if anything, should 
increase it. Hoǁeǀeƌ, it is ƋuestioŶaďle if the defeŶdaŶt is ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s dƌuŶkeŶ 
behaviour rather than just his own.48 ‘ǇaŶ ƋuestioŶs if iŶtoǆiĐatioŶ ͚iŶĐulpates oƌ eǆĐulpates the 
ŵaŶ aĐĐused of ƌape͛.49 It is tƌue to saǇ that aŶ iŶtoǆiĐated ŵaŶ ŵaǇ ďe ͚less attuŶed͛ to the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s 
desires when intoxicated,50 but this is the risk he also takes with his choice to become intoxicated. 
Just as the victim is aware their behaviour may be affected, so is he.  
Much of these thoughts may be linked to the stereotypical and very traditionalist views of men and 
women in patriarchal society. As Kramer notes: 
͞The tƌaditioŶal ďelief that ŵeŶ ŵust ďe the seǆual aggƌessoƌs ǁhile ǁoŵeŶ ŵust tƌǇ to appeaƌ 
Đhaste saǇiŶg ͞Ŷo͟ eǀeŶ ǁheŶ theǇ do Ŷot ŵeaŶ it, ƌeŵaiŶs peƌǀasiǀe͟.51 
Alcohol is often believed to iŶĐƌease the ŵaŶ͛s adherence to his gender role, whilst it has the 
opposite effect on the female victim, lowering her inhibitions and allowing her typically feminine 
behaviour to alter. Therefore, his culpability is reduced, whilst hers is increased, ďeĐause ͚soĐietǇ 
views women who drink as sexually promiscuous and aĐĐeptaďle taƌgets foƌ seǆual assault͛.52 
Subscribing to this theory is a spectacularly worrying thought. It allows cases to be labelled as 
͚seduĐtioŶ͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ ƌape.53 Our perceptions of men and women have evolved far beyond this in 
the twenty-first century, and the criminal law must reflect this.54 As Firth shrewdly observes: 
                                                          
43 Cole, Supra n() 156 
44 H “aul ͚Foƌŵeƌ Judge “aǇs ‘ape CoŶǀiĐtioŶ ‘ates Will Not Iŵpƌoǀe UŶtil WoŵeŶ “top GettiŶg “o DƌuŶk͛ The 
Independent 26th August 2014See also A ToppiŶg, ͚The Bluƌƌed LiŶes of CapaĐitǇ to CoŶseŶt iŶ Rape’, (2016) 4 
North East Law Review 72 
45 ICM, ͚“eǆual Assault ‘eseaƌĐh: “uŵŵaƌǇ ‘epoƌt͛, ;ϮϬϬϱͿ ϴ 
46 Topping, Supra n(44) 88 
47 Wallerstein, Supra n() 327 
48 Ryan, Supra n() 407 
49 Ibid 408 
50 Ibid 412 
51 Kramer, Supra n() 118 
52 Ibid, 121 
53 Ibid, 146, see also State v Thomas No. B9198729 Nov 13 1991 (California) 
54 Home Office Report, Supra n() 1.1.4 
͞Rape iŶǀolǀiŶg alĐohol ďeĐoŵes ƌe-presented as a problem of female drinking rather than male 
ǀioleŶĐe͟.55 
This narrow interpretation of the true crux of the matter ignores both male reactions and male 
rape.56 Indeed, in a study with focus groups faced with a case of similar facts to Bree, more attention 
was given to the defendant being wrongly accused than to the harm this event caused to the 
victim.57 There was more concern for the attƌiďutiŶg of the laďel ͚ƌapist͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ eǀaluatiŶg if 
rape had actually occurred.58  
Though these acquaintance-rapes featuring voluntary intoxication are often viewed as less serious, 
research shows that the effects of such encounters are often greater victimisation, and longer 
recovery time.59 There are also feelings of ͚ďeiŶg at fault͛ foƌ laĐk of ĐautioŶ aŶd uŶǁaƌƌaŶted tƌust.60 
The victim already blames herself, but it is not necessary for the criminal law to follow suit if she did 
not consent or lacked the capacity to do so. In Bromwich,61 the defeŶĐe͛s Đƌoss-examination of the 
victim made sure to have her admit that she had gone out with her friends on the night in question 
with the purpose of getting drunk. Why is that relevant? The culpability does not lie with this choice 
but the choices made at the time of the act of sexual intercourse. Elvin has suggested that the judges 
in Bree missed a vital opportunity to elaborate on the fact that assessing the circumstances for the 
purposes of determining reasonable belief in consent does not include the victim impairing their 
own judgment by drinking alcohol.62 
The reality is that the end result of voluntary intoxication may be just the same as all of the other 
situations covered by the list of rebuttable presumptions in s75 Sexual Offences Act 2003, namely 
that sexual autonomy is eroded.63 This eƌosioŶ is Ŷot Đaused ďǇ the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s dƌiŶkiŶg, ďut ďǇ the 
aĐĐused͛s aĐtioŶs iŶ ǀiolatioŶ of theiƌ ĐouŶteƌpaƌt͛s ǁishes. He Đhooses foƌ his victim, regardless of 
their capacity to choose themselves or their lack of consent. If the victim chooses intoxication, this 
does not and should not negate protection of the law.64 
Both or Neither? 
Are they both reckless? Are they both vulnerable? Perhaps, if it is a situation where both the 
accused and victim got intoxicated together, this is a path to consider. Hurd ponders this same 
thought, stating that responsibility should not vary among actors: 
͞so that the drunken man who has sex with a woman he knows is not consenting is responsible for 
rape while the drunken woman who invites sex is not sufficiently responsible to make such sex 
ĐoŶseŶsual͟.65 
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This might take the notion a little too far, but may be worth considering for the drunken man who 
misses non-consent precursors due to his intoxicated state. We already know that drunk intent is 
still intent and this offers no excuse,66 and that the reckless act of intoxication itself sufficiently 
covers reckless mens rea and basic intent crimes. Wallerstein argues this must be distinguished from 
victims because while both involve deliberate choice, there are vast differences between intention 
and consent.67 Is theiƌ ͚fault͛ iŶ ǀoluŶtaƌilǇ gettiŶg dƌuŶk foƌ oŶe aŶd Ŷot the otheƌ?68 If intoxication 
increases the risk that something might go wrong, or there could be unwanted consequences which 
floǁ diƌeĐtlǇ oƌ iŶdiƌeĐtlǇ fƌoŵ the iŶtoǆiĐatioŶ, ǁho is ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ ͚shaƌed ƌisk-takiŶg͛, ǁheŶ the 
accused and victim get drunk together?69 ‘ǇaŶ asseƌts that if this is the sĐeŶaƌio, theŶ ͚ďoth aƌe 
victiŵs oƌ Ŷeitheƌ aƌe ǀiĐtiŵs͛.70 There is no reason why one should have the responsibility of staying 
sober enough to judge the situation correctly.71 This is almost affirmed in Bree, where it was held 
that the victim would not be relinquished from choices made whilst drunk just as the accused would 
not be.72 
This argument is countered by Kramer, who asserts that women should be able to drink without 
͚feaƌiŶg assault oƌ aŶ aĐĐusatioŶ that theǇ asked to ďe ƌaped͛.73 Whilst this is correct, it can also be 
said to extend to men, who would wish to be able to get drunk without the fear of being accused of 
rape by a victim who regrets their intoxicated actions. The law seems to be at odds with the double 
standard society seems to hold in this area.74 The most difficult task of the criminal law here is trying 
to decipher intentions and actions at a time when both the victim and the accused had a temporary 
distorted reality where judgments are clouded and social constraints are less of a worry due to 
lowered inhibitions.75  
ReasoŶaďle Belief iŶ the ViĐtiŵ’s CapaĐity 
The statutory definition of rape contained within the Sexual Offences Act 2003 considers not mere 
non-ĐoŶseŶt, ďut the aĐĐused͛s ƌeasoŶable belief that consent was present.76 The usual concept with 
any kind of objective standard within criminal law is to remove intoxication from the situation. For 
example, within the rules of self-defence and mistake, we ask if the mistaken belief that violence 
ǁas ŶeĐessaƌǇ ǁas a ƌesult of the defeŶdaŶt͛s iŶtoǆiĐatioŶ – if it was, then the defendant cannot rely 
on that mistake, even if it was honestly made.77 IŶtoǆiĐatioŶ appeaƌs to ƌeŵoǀe the ͚ƌeasoŶaďle͛ 
element from any belief held because heavy alcohol consumption does not make us reasonable 
beings. An intoxicated man may genuinely believe that the victim is consenting to sex, or that the 
victim has the capacity to consent to sex, but is that belief reasonably held? 
There are many signs that would likely send a signal to the accused that the victim is in a heavily 
intoxicated state. For example, excessive vomiting, or being unable to walk or stand unaided.78 Can 
the accused hold a reasonable belief that the victim gave genuine consent or had the capacity to do 
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so in such circumstances? Many academics have advocated for a level beyond which capacity, and 
the aĐĐused͛s ƌeasoŶaďle ďelief iŶ ĐapaĐitǇ to ĐoŶseŶt oƌ ĐoŶseŶt itself, ǁould ďe iŶ seƌious douďt.79 
Do the facts in a case such as Bree, where the victim was vomiting, and had to be showered and put 
to bed, not suggest a person who is intoxicated beyond the point of capacity to consent?80 To a 
sober person this may be obvious, but to an intoxicated person in a similar position, perhaps not. 
Focus group studies on similar facts have found this to be the general opinion of participants., with 
most evaluating that the accused should be acquitted.81  Some participants did recognise that the 
accused should have realised he should not have had sexual intercourse with the victim when she 
had been vomiting, but that alone was not enough to suggest that she actually lacked capacity to 
consent.82 In fact, soŵe poiŶted out that it ǁas ͚uŶƌeasoŶaďle͛ to eǆpeĐt aŶ aĐĐused ǁho had ďeeŶ 
mutually drinking with the victim to be able to appreciate the point at which she lacked the ability to 
give genuine legal consent.83 
However, not all victims may be so visibly drunk, aŶd peƌhaps aŶ aĐĐused͛s ďelief ŵaǇ ďe ŵoƌe likelǇ 
deeŵed ƌeasoŶaďle if this ǁas the Đase, ǁith otheƌ ǁitŶesses also ŵisĐalĐulatiŶg the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s heaǀǇ 
state of intoxication.84 Of course, Bree was not decided this way, and this leaves a spectacularly high 
threshold for how intoxicated a victim must be before capacity to consent is negated.85 Perhaps 
consent will be mistakenly conferred in such circumstances, giving the accused a reasonable belief in 
consent. So we might also need to ask if the victim had the capacity to correct such a mistake? 
One of the biggest problem with intoxicated sexual relations is that cues may be vague and indirect. 
Ryan asserts that in a drunken state, the accused might acknowledge only those which are 
consistent with his belief that the victim wants to engage in sex.86 Of course, ignoring any that 
indicate otherwise is a reckless act and would be likely to negate reasonable belief. At the time of 
peŶetƌatioŶ, Ŷo ŵeaŶs Ŷo, eǀeŶ if the aĐĐused ƌeĐogŶised seǀeƌal otheƌ ͚Ǉes͛ iŶdiĐatoƌs prior to this. 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, oŶe studǇ has shoǁŶ that ϯϵ% of the ǁoŵeŶ suƌǀeǇed had iŶ faĐt used ͚tokeŶ ƌesistaŶĐe͛ 
at least once with potential suitors,87 so the intoxicated confusion over precursors is certainly a grey 
area. 
This conundrum is by no means unique to our jurisdiction, and is debated in courts throughout the 
Western world. A paiƌ of ĐoŶtƌastiŶg Đases iŶ CalifoƌŶia disĐussed the topiĐ of the aĐĐused͛s 
intoxicated belief that the victim had capacity to give consent. Whilst one case considered an honest 
and reasonable but mistaken belief that the victim retained her capacity was held to be a defence to 
rape in one case,88 an earlier case had held that such an intoxicated belief in genuine consent would 
not be reasonable or in good faith.89 If the accused and the victim are equally intoxicated, navigating 
this path to apportion blame is difficult. If the victim was much more excessively intoxicated than 
the accused, this may be a much easier scenario to deal with. Such circumstances may also negate 
any belief being reasonable because the accused would be in a much better position to assess the 
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situation.90 Evidence of this could be adduced to negate reasonable belief in consent, such as paying 
the bill, carrying the victim to a car or into a hotel or even driving.91 
It would not be just to ask for only honest belief from the intoxicated accused, and reasonable belief 
of the soďeƌ aĐĐused. AssessiŶg ͚all the ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes͛ to deĐipheƌ aŶ aĐĐused͛s ďelief iŶ legallǇ ǀalid 
consent does not include voluntary intoxication.92 The need for a belief to reasonable rather than 
just honest was included in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 with good reason.93 Honest belief remains 
as a ŵeƌe ďaĐkgƌouŶd ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐe to assessiŶg if the aĐĐused͛s ďelief Đould ďe deeŵed 
reasonable.94 So remains the problem that if an accused takes advantage of a drunk victim, aware 
that her choices may be affected by her intoxication, only the broad scope of section 74 is available 
to guide the courts on these issues of consent.95 An interesting idea is summed up by Goodman: 
͞Aŵďiguous ĐoŶseŶt ďeĐoŵes ŵoƌe aŵďiguous aŶd less aďle to ĐoŶstitute adeƋuate ĐoŶseŶt to 
Ŷegate a Đhaƌge of ƌape, the ŵoƌe alĐohol a feŵale has ĐoŶsuŵed͟96 
She articulates that any dissent, even mild forms, should be enough to have the accused realise that 
proceeding with sexual relations could be non-consensual.97 Perhaps the notion that affirmative 
consent is required, rather than a lack of dissent, is an idea to be seriously explored. 
It is unlikely the accused is the only person in the unfortunate situation to miss cues and precursors 
we might less easily recognise when drunk. The victim too may, due to intoxication, fail to realise the 
aĐĐused͛s iŶteŶtioŶs uŶtil the situatioŶ is upoŶ heƌ. IŶ the Đase of Bree, the defendant brought the 
victim a glass of water and helped her to bed. This is hardly something even a sober person would 
recognise is a seductive precursor to sexual activity. If the victim misses cues that the accused is 
interested in having sexual relations with her because of her voluntarily intoxicated state, does this 
have any impact on his reasonable belief based upon her lack of dissent?98 This may add more 
weight to the argument for the necessity of an affirmative consent being required in cases of 
intoxicated intercourse. 
Retrospective Regret and Memory Loss 
Another difficulty of cases involving voluntary intoxication on the part of the victim is distinguishing 
non-consent at the time to regret after the fact. This problem is often exacerbated by memory loss 
on the part of the victim in determining what happened, and perhaps having to fill in the gaps using 
sober judgment. The victim, whether consciously or not, may decide what they would have done 
based upon their sober perceptions rather than their intoxicated state. However, it is questionable 
whether this same memory loss may also be indicative of the victim being in a state of incapacity at 
the time of penetration. 
Sexual relations are often regretted – whether sober or intoxicated.99 Wertheimer has suggested 
that women know when they decide to drink excessive amounts of alcohol that they may make 
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decisions they would not make sober.100 The decisions made when intoxicated are unlikely to be 
good ƌefleĐtioŶ of a peƌsoŶ͛s sober goals and values,101 but not still having sight of said values when 
drunk does not mean that capacity has evaporated. If a decision was made when intoxicated in 
diƌeĐt ĐoŶtƌast ǁith a ǀiĐtiŵ͛s Ŷoƌŵal ďehaǀiouƌ, that is Ŷot to saǇ it ǁas Ŷot a legallǇ ǀalid ĐhoiĐe 
she made at the time. However, her sober self might equate such a making such a choice as being 
incapable of making the right choice. She was not incapable of choosing, but incapable of choosing 
in line with her sober self. 
False accusations of rape are made for a number of reasons. Indeed, false accusations are one of 
many issues tested every time a crime is reported.102 Ryan explains some of these specific to rape to 
be the jealous girlfriend having an affair with a married man, the teenager who does not want her 
parents to know she consented to sex, and the woman who regrets her actions.103 Of these three 
scenarios, the latter may not be a conscious false reporting, but a disbelief on the part of the victim 
that she could have chosen to engage in such behaviour even when heavily intoxicated. Feeling 
͚shaŵe͛ is a pƌoŵiŶeŶt featuƌe of the aĐĐouŶts of rape victims.104 This may extend to those who are 
in absolute denial about decisions they made at a time when they were unable to weigh up the pros 
and cons of sexual relations the way they might have sober.105 The point at which such an ability 
leaves the realm of less inhibited, and becomes incapacity needs to be clear.106 
Only One Account Available 
When alcohol blurs memory, it may often prove to be a barrier for the prosecution in establishing a 
credible case. Unless the victim was unconscious or involuntarily intoxicated so as to give rise to one 
of the rebuttable presumptions, the burden of proof will remain with the prosecution to prove that 
the victim did not consent. That is no easy task with only one consistent account of the events. The 
victim in Bree stated that there were periods of time for which she had no recollection at all. The 
appeal court said the issue was whether there was no consent, not if the victim could remember 
what happened, or if she regrets it.107 Does memory loss signify moments of unconsciousness? A 
state in which the line between capacity and incapacity has been crossed? Or just the after effects of 
an alcohol fuelled night during which the victim made her own decisions? The court in Tambedou 
stated: 
͞The juƌǇ ǁas eŶtitled to ĐoŶsideƌ aďseŶĐe of ĐoŶseŶt aŶd to distiŶguish it fƌoŵ eǀideŶĐe of aďseŶĐe 
of ŵeŵoƌǇ͟.108 
Memory loss does not equate lack of consent, nor does it necessarily indicate lack of capacity to give 
legally valid consent. It is merely evidence to be considered when deciding on such matters. A study 
of barristers showed an overwhelming response from participants that legislation could not assist in 
this matter further due to the unique nature of alcohol and how it affects each individual.109 The 
confusion over what happened to the victim is no doubt for her both frustrating and frightening. 
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Even more frightening is the prospect that in cases where the victim cannot remember but was 
conscious at the time, consent will be presumed, or at least reasonable belief in it.110 As Cowan 
notes: 
͞The ĐoŵplaiŶaŶt’s iŶaďilitǇ to ƌeŵeŵďeƌ…ďeĐoŵes the spaĐe ǁheƌe the defeŶdaŶt’s ďelief iŶ 
ĐoŶseŶt oĐĐupies aŶd takes ƌoot͟.111 
This leaves the courts with an incredulous predicament. Either allow the sober victim to fill in gaps in 
her memory based on her own judgment of the usual behaviour of her intoxicated self, or allow the 
defendant to fill these holes with a memory which may also be fogged with intoxication. The victim 
must then deal with the added trauma of others making a presumption that she did consent because 
she was drunk, which rarely happens with other crimes.112 Research indicates that the public believe 
women are more likely to lie about being raped when alcohol is involved.113 
The Sober Victim Dealing with The Drunk Victim’s AĐtioŶs 
There is no doubt that the sober victim having to deal with a situation where they cannot remember 
fully what occurred, and they do not believe they would have consented to sex with the accused, 
must be disturbing and devastating. This does not mean that we should not respect her autonomous 
decisions made in such circumstances. Though some academics have advocated for the courts not to 
legally recognise drunk consent as consent114, it is difficult to see how this could be feasible without 
uŶdeƌŵiŶiŶg a peƌsoŶ͛s ƌight to ďeĐoŵe iŶtoǆiĐated aŶd ŵake theiƌ oǁŶ deĐisioŶs. Kƌaŵeƌ͛s 
contention is that this stems from the view that women are not supposed to want sexual intercourse 
or be sexually deviant, yet do have sexual desires, giving them motive for crying rape.115 
In the case of Dougal,116 the victim repeatedly claimed that she would not have had sex in the 
circumstances claimed by the accused – namely in a corridor. It is difficult to determine the exact 
situation a person would or would not be open to enjoying or willing to try when excess alcohol is 
involved. It may be easier to establish this if the victim immediately reacts and reports the rape. For 
example, in the case of Bromwich, the victim was crying hysterically, went to hospital, and still 
appeared drunk and rambling four hours later when speaking with police. The hospital staff said she 
appeared to be suffering from amnesia,117 and she later claimed to have no recollection except for 
vomiting. Similar facts occurred in Hamadi of immediate drunk and hysterical rape claims.118 This is 
not sober regret, but a much more immediate realisation of what has happened. This is in contrast 
to the victim in Bree, who first phoŶed a fƌieŶd the Ŷeǆt ŵoƌŶiŶg to saǇ she had ďeeŶ ͚used͛ ďefoƌe 
questioning if she consented or had the capacity to legally do so.119 This seems to be a 
reclassification of consensual sex in order to rationalise regretted drunken behaviour.120 However, as 
Lewis has noted in her response to the 2006 Consultation Paper ͚CoŶǀiĐtiŶg ‘apists aŶd PƌoteĐting 
ViĐtiŵs͛, there are misconceptions about the timing of reporting and behaviour of victims who claim 
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to have been raped. She contemplates the usefulness of a jury direction that delay is not evidence of 
a false complaint.121 
Distancing the Choice to Have Sex 
It is questionable, if consent is given by a heavily intoxicated victim, if this is a reflection of only the 
intoxication rather than her preferences, or is in faĐt ͚tƌueƌ thaŶ that eǆpƌessed uŶdeƌ ĐoŶditioŶs of 
soďƌietǇ͛ ďeĐause soĐial ƌestƌaiŶts ǁhiĐh goǀeƌŶ the soďeƌ aƌe ƌeŵoǀed.122 The jury are likely to 
consider the account of the victim (if female) giving regard to stereotypical views of how a female 
should behave.123 Cole has commented on the possibility that the indulgence in alcohol may 
purposely be chosen so women can distance themselves from the decision to have sex, and she 
makes the conscious decision to allow her intoxicated self to go on and make such decisions.124 At 
the other end of the spectrum, some men may consume vast quantities of alcohol as a way to lessen 
their reservations about pressuring or forcing women into sex they might not necessarily want.125 
Alcohol and the Human Body 
Though in Bree, it ǁas stated that a ͚gƌid sǇsteŵ͛ foƌ ĐapaĐitǇ ǁould Ŷot ďe possiďle,126 being able to 
distinguish between different levels of intoxication for the purpose of discovering if the victim had 
capacity to consent would certainly solve some problems.127 Unfortunately, because alcohol effects 
are dependent upon a number of factors, a legislative structure to operate in this capacity is highly 
improbable. The point at which a person crosses the elusive threshold from retaining capacity to 
consent and legally incapacity so as to adheƌe to the seĐtioŶ ϳϰ defiŶitioŶ ͚is as iŶdiǀidual as she 
is͛.128 It cannot be scientifically calibrated.129 
Variants on the effect of alcohol will include weight, age, body type, drinking history, how fast you 
drink, if you have eaten and any medication you are taking.130 Genetic factors can also come into 
play, with some of us having less enzymes that break down the alcohol, a variant often seen in 
people of Asian descent.131 It is also known to often affect women more than men, due to a higher 
level of body fat. AlĐohol is kŶoǁŶ to sloǁ the ďƌaiŶ͛s fuŶĐtioŶiŶg , iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ the pƌefƌoŶtal Đoƌteǆ 
which regulates reasoning and decision making.132 
A study of almost thirty-thousand respondents in twenty-one different countries of adults aged 
thirty-four and under was conducted to establish the emotions people associated with different 
types of alcohol. The findings showed that people usually dƌiŶk ͚to aĐhieǀe a paƌtiĐulaƌ goal͛ ofteŶ 
associated with an emotive state,133 but this may also increase the chances of out-of-character 
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actions and behaviour. Almost half of respondents reported that drinking spirits made them feel 
͚seǆǇ͛ and confident,134 and drinking to achieve such emotions was reported more by women than 
men. They also found that whilst respondents were aware of the negative impact particular types of 
alĐohol ŵight haǀe, suĐh as ĐausiŶg aggƌessiǀe ďehaǀiouƌ, theǇ Đƌaǀed the ͚positiǀe͛ eŵotioŶs that 
went with them. This is suppoƌted ďǇ Kƌaŵeƌ͛s ďelief that theƌe is an expectancy that alcohol will 
increase sexual arousal and lower inhibitioŶs foƌ ǁoŵeŶ ǁhilst iŶĐƌeasiŶg ŵeŶ͛s feeliŶgs off 
dominance,135 ĐƌeatiŶg aŶ ͚alĐohol ŵǇopia͛ ǁhiĐh deǀiates fƌoŵ soĐiallǇ aĐĐeptaďle ďehaǀiouƌ.136 
The Way Forward 
Cases are generally not as concerned with actually lacking capacity as they are with a victim lacking 
the capacity to choose as her sober self would have. When a victim cannot remember if she 
consented to sexual intercourse with the accused or not, or if she was even capable of consenting, 
do ǁe alloǁ heƌ to judge this ďǇ heƌ soďeƌ staŶdaƌds, oƌ alloǁ the defeŶdaŶt͛s aĐĐouŶt to ŵesh ǁith 
hers and fill in the gaps? Neither are an appealing prospect, but without the benefit of an eye-
witness, other options are lacking. 
There is no clear way to establish between different levels of intoxicated states to decide if a person 
legally had the capacity to consent to sexual intercourse at the time it took place. There is also no 
exact way to establish if consent occurred at all for an intoxicated victim who cannot fully remember 
the events. Though a ǀiĐtiŵ͛s deĐisioŶ to haǀe iŶtoǆiĐated seǆ ŵaǇ Ŷot ͚sƋuaƌe͛ ǁith ǁhat she ŵight 
have chosen sober,137 if she has indeed chosen and was capable of doing so this must be respected, 
even if her sober mind is unhappy with this outcome.  
It might be advantageous to have a non-exhaustive list of precursors that might be used as evidence 
of incapacity to consent. This could include physical manifestations of heavy intoxication such as 
vomiting, inability to stand and walk, having to be undressed and a wish to lay down. That fact that 
the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s dƌiŶkiŶg ŵade the ƌape possiďle does Ŷot laǇ ďlaŵe at the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s feet. Equally, just 
because the likelihood of a victim having consenting to sex might have increased with their 
consumption of alcohol, this does not mean that they did, no that we should presume this.  
For the victim who is capable of giving consent but has partaken in excessive alcohol consumption, 
there are opportunities for reform. GoodŵaŶ͛s recommendation of a sliding scale, requiring a more 
explicit affirmation of consent the more a person is intoxicated, has much merit.138 This is equally 
applicable to the alcohol consumption of the accused – the less he has had to drink, the more he is 
responsible for gaining effective legal consent.139 This may assist in shifting the focus from blaming 
the victim for their alcohol consumption, to requiring specific express consent in such a situation to 
make her desires very clear. This will still not necessarily match with her sober desires, but will give 
the courts a clear way forward. Of course, there are other paths. If excessive voluntary intoxication 
was included in the list of rebuttable presumptions as the Home Office Report had suggested, we 
would begin with a presumption of non-consent, with the burden then being on the defendant to 
prove otherwise. 
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There is merit in sending a clear message to the public about intoxicated behaviour and sexual 
relationships, specifically circumstances in which sexual activity is likely to be wrong.140 This may be 
especially important for situations of acquaintance rape and mutual risk-taking. A woman has the 
right to express her sexual desires, but also to refuse sexual situations as she sees fit. However, we 
must proceed with caution, and allow the judiciary to maintain flexibility when dealing with the 
extremes of human behaviour.141 A statute establishing the definition of capacity and incapacity to 
consent may present a narrow context which, though may bring consistency, would also bring its 
own complications.142 
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